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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Scott Erickson appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts 
finding him guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of a child. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Erickson was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
based on incidents involving his step-daughter and his biological daughter when 
each was around ten years old. (R., pp.53-54.) The jury found Erickson guilty of 
two counts of sexual abuse of a child. (R., pp.248-249.) The district court 
entered judgment upon the convictions, and Erickson timely appealed. (R., 
pp.286-288, 300-303, 307-312.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Erickson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State violate Mr. Erickson's and the jurors' right to 
equal protection when it used its preemptory challenges to 
only strike men from the jury? 
2. Did the prosecutor's misconduct in this case violate Mr. 
Erickson's rights to due process and a fair trial? 
3. Were Mr. Erickson's rights to due process and to be free 
from self incrimination violated when the State elicited 
testimony from Detective Vollmer that Mr. Erickson refused 
to come in for an interview? 
4. Did the district court commit reversible error when it admitted 
evidence of prior bad acts of the defendant? 
5. Did the repeated misconduct and the erroneous admission 
of evidence in this case result in cumulative error depriving 
Mr. Erickson of a fair trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Erickson failed to establish clear error in the district court's rejection 
of his objection to the manner in which the state exercised its peremptory 
challenges? 
2. Has Erickson failed to establish. that the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct, let alone misconduct so egregious as to rise to the level of 
fundamental error? 
3. Has Erickson failed to establish that the introduction of testimony that he 
refused to participate in an interview with law enforcement is reversible 
error? 
4. Has Erickson failed to establish that the admission of evidence that 
Tammy was not receiving child support is reversible error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Erickson Has Failed To Establish Clear Error In The District Court's Rejection Of 
His Objection To The State's Exercise Of Its Peremptory Challenges 
A. Introduction 
Erickson argued that the state improperly exercised all of its peremptory 
challenges to exclude men from the jury. (Trial Tr., p.39, L.14 - p.40, L.6.)1 
Following a hearing and after reviewing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 
(1986) and J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141 (1994) the district court 
overruled Erickson's objection to the state's exercise of its peremptory 
challenges. Contrary to Doe's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and 
the applicable law supports the district court's ruling. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's finding regarding "the validity of the state's explanation for 
exercising peremptory challenges on minority jurors" is reviewed on appeal for 
clear error. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 86, 856 P.2d 872, 876 (1993). "[T]he 
trial court's finding with regard to the state's explanation will be overturned on 
appeal only if it is clearly erroneous in light of the facts as a whole." State v. 
Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 933, 935 P.2d 183, 196 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Araiza, 
124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877). 
1 Although the record is slight, a fair reading does indicate that Erickson attempted to preserve his 
objection prior to the swearing of the jury, and did in fact put his objection on the record shortly 
thereafter. His objection appears, therefore, to be timely. State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 904 
P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1995) (Balson motion must be made before the jury is sworn, or it is waived.) 
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C. The District Court Rejected Erickson's Challenge To The State's Exercise 
Of It's Peremptory Challenges. Reaching The Correct Result Via An 
Incorrect Legal Theory 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude racial minorities from jury service violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141 (1994), 
the court extended Batson to apply to exclusions based on gender. When faced 
with an assertion that a party has exercised a peremptory challenge in a 
discriminatory fashion the trial court must evaluate the Batson challenge under 
the following three-part test: 
First, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must make a 
prima facie showing that the challenge was exercised on the basis 
of race. Second, if the prima facie showing is made, the burden 
shifts to the party attempting to exercise the peremptory challenge 
to articulate a race-neutral explanation for its decision. Batson, 
supra. Third, if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial 
court must then determine whether the party attacking the 
peremptory challenge has met its burden of proving a purposeful 
discrimination based on race. 
State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 932, 935 P.2d 183, 195 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations 
omitted). Accord State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87, 856 P.2d 872, 877 (1993). 
Erickson did make a prima facie showing that the challenges were 
exercised on a prohibited basis. (Trial Tr., p.39, L.14 - p.40, L.6.) The state 
then articulated a gender-neutral explanation for its approach to the exercise of 
its peremptory challenges: 
We just simply exercise our prempts [sic] as we determine 
based upon the voir dires and based upon the questionnaire we felt 
best favored the State. . .. 
4 
We just felt we need a jury of parents and we kind of 
focused on getting parents. We wanted some grandparents on 
there, but we really didn't care whether they were fathers, mothers, 
grandmas, or grandfathers. 
(Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.4-14.) 
After reviewing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) and J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141 (1994), the district court overruled Erickson's 
objection based on its mistaken belief that those cases required relief only where 
the resulting jury excluded all of the protected class (i.e., was either all white or 
all female, respectively) and on its finding that white males are not a protected 
class. (Trial Tr., p.58, L.15 - p.61, L.15.) The trial court did not address the 
gender-neutral selection criteria articulated by the state or the standard for 
reviewing such a claim as set forth in Owen and Araiza. 
The district court reached the right result, albeit under a different theory. 
Where the lower court reaches the correct result by relying on an incorrect legal 
theory, the appellate court will affirm the result under the correct legal theory. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. 
Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997); see also State v. 
Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 864, 11 P.3d 481, 483 (2000). In this case, the state 
did in fact articulate a credible, gender-neutral reason for the method by which it 
exercised its peremptory challenges. Guided by the potential jurors' answers to 
the questionnaires and in voir dire, and given the nature and circumstances of 
the alleged crimes, the state sought a jury of parents and grandparents. Given 
that Erickson never addressed the gender-neutral explanation, and that the 
gender-neutral explanation was credible and reasonable in light of the 
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circumstances and nature of the alleged crimes, the district court correctly 
rejected Erickson's objections, albeit based on an incorrect legal theory. The 
district court's decision should be upheld. 
11. 
Erickson Has Failed To Show Prejudicial Error Regarding Any Claim Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A Introduction 
Erickson claims the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence with regard to 
the reasons for the nearly three-year delay between the crimes being reported 
and the charges being filed. (Appellant's brief, p.31.) Erickson also contends 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he asked Erickson's father whether 
there were any illegal substances found in the truck, belonging to Erickson, that 
Erickson's father turned over to Erickson's estranged wife. (Appellant's brief, 
p.33.) Finally, Erickson contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
opening and closing arguments by vouching, misstating the burden of proof, 
appealing to the jurors' emotions and referring to the law regarding child custody 
disputes. (Appellant's brief, pp.41-46.) 
In several of these instances, the prosecutor did nothing contrary to what 
he was entitled to do during the course of trial. Even assuming one or more 
comments or questions by the prosecutor may have been improper, such 
conduct by the prosecutor was not constitutionally harmful. See State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175, 1180-81 (2007). 
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B. Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governing Claims Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere 
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or 
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by 
the United States Supreme Court: "[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors' 
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone 
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") 
In that regard, the Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct 
may occur where the prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or 
"implicate[s] other specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or 
the right to remain silent." Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. However, "a criminal 
conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments 
standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by 
so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the 
fairness of the trial." United States v. Young. 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the 
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Court must consider the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would 
have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly." J.lt at 11-12. 
Consistent with Darden and Young, the Idaho Supreme Court has held 
that a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only when the 
conduct is sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. State v. 
Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999). Misconduct by a 
prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct is so egregious or 
inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or could not have been, 
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that it should be 
disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d 127, 140-141 
(1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916,923 (1990); State v. 
Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ames, 109 
Idaho 373, 707 P .2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). 
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing 
argument the Supreme Court has stated: 
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to 
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the 
same proportions [as repeated mischaracterizations of an exhibit]. 
Such arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are seldom 
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation 
frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than 
crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify 
prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not 
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have 
its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy 
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less 
damaging interpretations. 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of 
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep 
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-
33 (1986)). The Idaho Court of Appeals has further recognized "[t]he right to due 
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and 
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for 
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991 ). 
Absent a timely objection at trial, an appellate court will generally not 
consider an issue on appeal unless the error alleged is "fundamental error." 
State v. McAway. 127 Idaho 54, 896 P.2d 962 (1995). An error is fundamental if 
it "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the 
foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to 
his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007). An error is not 
deemed fundamental and may not be reviewed for the first time on appeal if it 
could have been cured by a timely objection. State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 68-
71, 951 P.2d 1288, 1295-98 (Ct. App. 1998). In the context of closing 
arguments, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it 
is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or 
9 
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the 
jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the 
evidence. More specifically, prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the 
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent 
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial 
court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (citations, 
quotations, and brackets omitted). 
Application of the foregoing standards to Erickson's claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct reveals he has failed to establish fundamental error. 
C. Erickson Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct By The 
Prosecutor's Reference To The Circumstances Surrounding The Delayed 
Filing Of Charges 
Erickson called his wife, Tammy, to testify in an effort to support his claim 
that the allegations against him were simply part of a very ugly separation. (Trial 
Tr., p.306, L.15 - p.318, L.4, p.374, Ls.17-23; p.498, Ls.3-15.) Erickson 
questioned why Tammy would allow their daughter and son to be around him 
after the allegations were made. (Trial Tr., p.457, L.22 - p.458, L.11.) Following 
this line of questioning, the state asked Tammy why she would allow him to have 
supervised visitation, and she explained that Erickson told her that law 
enforcement told him the charges had been dropped for lack of evidence. (Trial 
Tr., p.458, L.22 - p.459, L.1.) Tammy immediately said "[i]t was dropped, but it 
wasn't because there wasn't enough evidence." (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.1-3.) The 
prosecutor asked "So you were unaware that the sheriffs office simply had lost 
that file and had not proceeded?" (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.10-11.) Erickson objected 
as assuming facts not in evidence, the court overruled the objection and Tammy 
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answered "Yes, Scott told me that. That he was questioned and that that was it." 
(Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.12-18.) Erickson now claims that it was prosecutor 
misconduct to ask the question, and to briefly refer to the file being lost in 
opening and closing argument, even though the court overruled his objection and 
allowed the question and the testimony. The prosecutor did not commit 
misconduct. 
Tammy's testimony that Erickson had told her the case was dropped for 
lack of evidence, and her testimony immediately thereafter that "it was dropped, 
but it wasn't because there wasn't enough evidence" gave rise to a reasonable 
question: if it was not dropped for lack of evidence, why was the case dropped? 
Tammy's testimony clearly evidences some knowledge, apparently gained after 
her communication with Erickson, that something happened to the case other 
than being dropped for lack of evidence. The prosecutor's follow-up question, 
while not a model of clarity, sought that answer. A more appropriate objection 
might have been that the question was leading. Asking a single, leading 
question in follow-up to a witness' testimony, however, does not amount to 
prosecutor misconduct, and certainly not fundamental error. 
Further, the prosecutor's reference to the circumstances of the lost file in 
opening and closing do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. Clearly, in 
discussing it in the opening, the prosecutor anticipated that the information about 
the lost file would be put into evidence. His question to Tammy was designed to 
do just that. Apparently, Erickson anticipated that it would be part of the 
evidence as well, because Erickson made no objection to the statement. Why 
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the prosecutor did not pursue the line of questioning after Tammy repeated what 
Erickson told her is not clear, and is unfortunate. It's clear from Tammy's 
immediately preceding remark that she is aware that different circumstances led 
to the delay in filing the charges. However, the prosecutor's obvious mistake in 
failing to follow-up when the answer sought was not immediately forthcoming is 
not so egregious as to constitute misconduct. 
Likewise, no objection was made to the prosecutor's mention of the lost 
file in rebuttal closing arguments. Reading the comments in the context of the 
prosecutor's closing argument as well as in the context of Erickson's closing 
argument, and keeping in mind the realities of trial and the improvisational nature 
of closing arguments, the prosecutor's brief mention in his rebuttal closing of an 
item that he apparently believed had been entered into evidence, and one that 
ultimately mattered little to the jurors' deliberations, was not so egregious as to 
amount to fundamental error. 
D. Erickson Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct By Violating 
The District Court's Ruling Regarding Erickson's Drug Use 
Erickson claims the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
"attempted to solicit testimony regarding Mr. Erickson's drug use ... without first 
obtaining a ruling." (Appellant's brief, p.33.) The district court ruled prior to trial 
that "any evidence of Defendant's criminal acts or bad acts pertaining to illegal 
drugs or controlled substances shall not be presented to the jury by an attorney 
or witness without the necessary hearing outside the presence of the jury." (R., 
p.184.) 
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After Erickson's father testified at length about the protracted dispute 
between Erickson and Tammy over possession of a truck from the marriage, he 
concluded his testimony by saying that the truck had been towed when Erickson 
was arrested in this case, he (Erickson's father) had paid to get it out of 
impound, and that shortly thereafter he called Tammy and told her to come get 
the truck. (Trial Tr., p.368, L.16 - p.369, L.9.) The prosecutor opened his cross-
examination by asking Erickson's father "Do you know whether or not there were 
any illegal substances found in that truck?" (Trial Tr., p.369, Ls.13-14.) Erickson 
objected, and the jury was excused. (Trial Tr., p.369, Ls.15-20.) The prosecutor 
explained that the question was intended not to reference Erickson's pending 
drug case, but to lay the foundation for his theory that Erickson's father turned 
over the truck with drugs in it as a means of "trying to entrap her because they 
knew there was meth in that car that the police had not recovered." (Trial Tr., 
p.371, Ls.18-24.) The prosecutor conceded that he thought all of the testimony 
about the truck was "kind of irrelevant anyway" but that he pursued it based on 
Erickson's presentation of his father's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.372, L.1 - p.373, 
L.9.) Ultimately, the district court sustained the objection (Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.13-
20, p.379, Ls.12-13), and the prosecutor moved on to a different line of 
questioning (Trial Tr., p.379, Ls.8-22). 
While it is indeed misconduct for a prosecutor to intentionally disregard a 
district court's evidentiary ruling, State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 
(2007), that is not what occurred in this case. The prosecutor's question did not 
directly implicate Erickson in drug use, nor did the prosecutor apparently intend 
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to do so. The prosecutor's assessment that both his and Erickson's line of 
questioning about the conflict over the truck and its eventual return was "kind of 
irrelevant" is apt, but his pursuit of that line of questioning and his attempt to 
meet Erickson's evidence does not constitute misconduct. 
E. Erickson Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct By Vouching, 
By Misstating The Burden Of Proof Or By lmpermissibly Appealing To The 
Jurors' Emotions 
Erickson claims that the prosecutor, in his opening and closing 
arguments, "vouched" for the credibility of the witnesses, misstated the burden of 
proof and impermissibly appealed to the juror's emotions. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.35-46.) At trial, Erickson objected only to statements that are now objected to 
as vouching, preserving only those arguments for appeal. Because none of the 
arguments, when read in the context of the trial and arguments and keeping in 
mind the realities of trial and the improvisational nature of opening and closing 
arguments, amount to misconduct, let alone fundamental error, Erickson has 
failed to establish fundamental error allowing review of his other claims or 
requiring reversal of his vouching claim. 
First, Erickson claims the prosecutor engaged in "vouching" in comments 
made in his opening and closing statements. (Appellant's brief, pp.36-39.) 
However, when viewed in the context in which each offending argument is made, 
the bulk of the statements objected to on appeal are made in the context of the 
prosecutor simply delineating the circumstances which give rise to a reasonable 
finding by the jury that a particular witness's testimony is believable on a 
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particular point. The balance of the comments, while unfortunate, do not rise to 
the level of fundamental error. 
For example, Erickson complains of the prosecutor's statement in opening 
that "What I'm going to tell you is I don't believe children under these 
circumstances are going to lie to you. I think you will find the truth." (Appellant's 
brief, p.365; Trial Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.6.) A review of the context in the 
whole of the opening argument reveals that the prosecutor is describing the 
expert's testimony about the effects on children who have been abused by family 
members and how that might lead to reluctance to report or testify, 
inconsistencies in reported details, etc. (Trial Tr., p.25, L.11 - p.28, L.11.) The 
statement in closing that "/ suggest to you she's telling the truth" (Appellant's 
brief, p.37) is not, on its face, vouching, and the immediately following 
statements about the circumstances which show credibility bear that out. (Trial 
Tr., p.482, Ls.11-17.) The statement that "Does that mean she's not credible? 
Absolutely not" is likewise followed immediately by specific references to 
testimony by both parties' experts that explain why there might be 
inconsistencies in a victim's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.484, Ls.7-24.) The 
prosecutor, ultimately, repeatedly referred not to his own belief in the victims' 
credibility, but to the truth-finding function of the trial itself: "They are subject to 
cross-examination. They are subject to speculation" (Trial Tr., p.28, Ls.2-4.); 
"And they took a lot of shots at them, a lot of cross-examination" (Trial Tr., p.486, 
LS.9-11 ). 
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The prosecutor's comments regarding the victims' mother and the 
believability of the testimony of the defense witnesses likewise largely come in 
the context of evaluating the context and circumstances of the testimony and the 
relationships between the witnesses. (Trial Tr., p.492, L.13 - p.493, L.18.) 
In the context of the entirety of the trial and the entirety of the closing 
arguments, the prosecutor's comments largely comply with the parameters of 
acceptable argument; what remains does not amount to egregious misconduct 
rising to the level of fundamental error. 
Second, Erickson claims the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof. 
(Appellant's brief, p.41.) When read in their entirety, the prosecutor's statements 
ultimately pull the jury back to a reminder that the state's burden of proof is 
"beyond a reasonable doubt": 
I just think the bottom line is this, it's our communities and our 
families, our children. We have the legal, moral, ethic obligation to 
protect them. You set a standard for myself as prosecutor. You 
set the standard for law enforcement. We look at these cases very 
carefully. What is the standard in Bear Lake County by a jury on 
what they're going to accept as proof of child molestation? That's 
all it's about. 
And if you're saying Mr. Helm, Lorissa, Crystal, Officer Martinez, it's 
just not there, I've got to have more than this, we understand that, 
but there is also a downside to it. I can't bring you the perfect case. 
There will always be the possibility there. I bring you two people 
molested by their father at pretty much the same age. One gives 
credibility to the other. One collaborates the other. The pattern is 
similar. Circumstances are similar. You as a juror are saying I 
don't believe either one of them. 
Ladies and gentleman, I tell you this is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
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(Trial Tr., p.526, Ls.6-25.) (Emphasis supplied.) There is no misstatement of the 
burden of proof; it is argument to the jury that the state has met the burden of 
proof. Erickson has failed to establish fundamental error. 
Finally, Erickson claims the prosecutor impermissibly appealed to the 
jurors' emotions by asking them to place themselves in the shoes of the victims. 
(Appellant's brief, p.43.) Again, these unobjected to statements, when read in 
their actual context, specifically link the victims' testimony and actions to the 
testimony of the state's expert: 
[The expert] told you that sometimes when kids are 
confronted by a total stranger, just clear out of the blue, that they 
will initially deny it. Isn't that Crystal? Had no idea that she's going 
to be confronted by a police officer and asked about her father. 
The initial reaction I think almost always in that case is not 
going to be all that unusual. You're going to deny. The officer is 
not somebody you know. It's not somebody you trust. I think she 
was - going to get her age right, I think she was about 13 or 14 
when she was confronted with this. You just - what would you 
say? You use your common sense. Put yourself in that position. 
What would you say? ... 
(Trial Tr., p.481, Ls.8-20.) The prosecutor did not ask the jury to put themselves 
in the shoes of the victim as a victim; the prosecutor asked the jury to do what 
Jury Instruction 5 tells them to do, namely, apply their common sense when 
evaluating whether the victims' actions and testimony are believable: 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate 
testimony. You bring with you to this courtroom all of the 
experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, 
and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same 
considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making 
these decisions are the considerations which you should apply in 
your deliberations. 
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(R., p.198.) Erickson has failed to establish misconduct by the prosecutor rising 
to the level of fundamental error. 
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111. 
The Introduction Of Evidence Of Erickson's Failure To Attend An Interview With 
Law Enforcement Is Harmless Error 
On appeal, Erickson challenges the introduction of testimony by the 
original investigating officer, on cross-examination during Erickson's presentation 
of his defense, that Erickson "refused to come in" for an interview regarding the 
allegations. (Appellant's brief, p.54; Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.) 
Erickson made no objection to the introduction of this testimony. While the 
introduction of such testimony, if not made for a permissible purpose, can be 
fundamental error subject to appellate review without objection, it still may be 
harmless. 
"An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the 
error." State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947, 950-51, 854 P.2d 290, 293-94 (Ct. App. 
1993)). In light of the evidence presented, even if this Court finds error, any error 
was harmless. 
Erickson's daughter testified that he touched "my boobs and my butt and 
asked me if I liked it how daddy touched me." (Trial Tr., p.84, Ls.20-22.) 
Erickson's step-daughter likewise testified that Erickson "touch[ed] my boobs and 
my butt." (Trial Tr., p.112, Ls.16~24, p.114, Ls.14-18.) While Erickson rightfully 
concludes that the case hinged on the credibility of Erickson's daughter and 
step-daughter, that does not preclude a finding that the jury would have reached 
the same result absent the introduction of the testimony. In fact, the jury's 
19 
verdicts demonstrated that its determination of the credibility of the victims had 
very little to do with information about the "family turmoil" or other extraneous 
information (such as whether Erickson spoke to police) when it determined that 
Erickson was not guilty of one count and found that he was guilty of included 
offenses on the other two counts based on the victims' testimony detailing the 
nature of the sexual contact. This Court can conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the jury would have reached the same result absent any error. 
IV. 
Erickson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Committed Reversible Error 
By Admitting Evidence That Tammy Erickson Was Not Receiving Child Support 
A. Introduction 
Erickson claims that the district court admitted impermissible character 
evidence, and did so without the state having given the notice required by I.RE. 
404(b). (Appellant's brief, p.59.) Specifically, Erickson objects to the admission 
of testimony by Tammy Erickson that she was not getting child support for her 
four children. Because the testimony was not evidence of "prior bad acts" by 
Erickson, its admission did not violate I.RE. 404(b). Further, if the testimony is 
construed by this court to be evidence of "bad acts," the district court correctly 
admitted it for a permissible purpose. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence and its decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only when 
there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 
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521-22, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231-32 (2003). Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence provides that evidence of other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" is generally 
inadmissible to prove the character of a person or that the person acted in 
conformity with that character. I.R.E. 404(b). Such evidence is admissible, 
however, to prove matters other than propensity. I.R.E. 404(b). 
C. Erickson Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Admission Of 
Evidence That Tammy Did Not Receive Child Support For Her Four 
Children, Two Of Which Were Not Erickson's, At A Time When Erickson 
And Tammy Were Not Divorced 
Erickson called his wife Tammy to testify about their relationship, 
specifically about the volatility of their separation, in an effort to support his claim 
that the allegations against him were simply part of a very ugly separation. Much 
of the testimony centered around a particularly heated dispute between Erickson 
and Tammy over who should have possession of a truck. (Trial Tr., p.303, L.15 
- p.318, L.4, p.374, Ls.17-23; p.498, Ls.3-15.) Tammy had two children from a 
previous marriage and two children with Erickson. (Trial Tr., p.304, L.24 - p.305, 
L.17.) Erickson's counsel elicited testimony from Tammy that she was angry 
about the circumstances of the separation from Erickson: "He left me and the 
kids with nothing. He would come throughout the evening and steal the vehicle 
so the kids didn't have a ride to school or to the doctor or anything else." (Trial 
Tr., p.310, Ls.9-16.) 
Tammy took the truck from Erickson's parents' house at a time when she 
was accompanied by three of her four children. (Trial Tr., p.310, Ls.9-22, p.315, 
L.7 - p.317, L.5, p.437, L.2 - p.439, L.B.) Erickson, his father and a sheriffs 
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deputy pursued Tammy and retrieved the truck. (Trial Tr., p.438, L.22 - p.439, 
L.8.) 
On rebuttal, the state called Tammy as a witness and asked her to explain 
the circumstances of her taking the truck from Erickson's parents' house: "Now 
at that time were you getting any child support--." (Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.9-10.) 
Erickson objected on the grounds that this was improper character evidence. 
(Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.11-16.) The state explained that it was attempting to "show 
her desperate need for a vehicle." (Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.19-20.) The court 
overruled Erickson's objection, and Tammy answered the question with "No." 
(Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.21-25.) 
Despite Erickson's claim that the court did not recognize this as character 
evidence, the court clearly did, allowing the admission of the testimony on the 
basis of the permissible purpose offered by the state. More to the point, the truly 
"bad" evidence of Erickson's character related to his support of his children had 
already been elicited by Erickson during the presentation of his defense when he 
elicited Tammy's testimony that Erickson "left me and the kids with nothing." 
(Trial Tr., p.310, L.9.) Further, the question was a broad one - "were you getting 
any child support" - put to a woman who was still legally married to Erickson but 
had two children from prior relationship, and did not directly implicate Erickson in 
any bad behavior. Finally, if the district court erred in admitting this testimony, it 
was harmless error, as the jury would have reached the same verdict absent the 
alleged error. Lopez, 141 Idaho at 578, 114 P.3d at 136. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury's verdict finding Erickson guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of a 
child. 
DATED this 1th day of June, 2009. 
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